RI

AGT-1161 · Payments

Payments Exception Agent

Repairs and reroutes failed cross-border payments.

critical riskreview

Trust score

88

grounding, fairness, oversight

Requests / 30d

38,364

model Azure OpenAI · gpt-4.1

Human approval

Required

data class Restricted

Last audit

2026-07-26

version v4.3

Agent architecture

Request path from the surface the customer or staff member touches, through the governance gateway, to the model and its wired systems

Entry surfaces

Retail Loan Origination

 

Business application · In-house (LOS)

Governance gateway

Truint policy enforcement point

9-stage filter chain · p99 54 ms

Evidence ledger writer

Hash-chained, RFC-3161 anchored

Agent runtime

Payments Exception Agent

AGT-1161 · v4.3 · trust 88

Azure OpenAI · gpt-4.1

 

LLM / model endpoint · Central India

Tools & data

core.accounts.close

 

Tool / function · Restricted

Policy & Product Knowledge Base

 

Data source · Internal

Enforcement chain on every request

  1. 1Identity & entitlementCaller identity resolved; agent entitlement checked against the registry record.
  2. 2Kill switchEstate and per-agent revocation state for AGT-1161 evaluated before any spend.
  3. 3Manifest checkOnly integrations on the signed manifest below are reachable.
  4. 4Budget & rateToken, cost and concurrency budgets for Payments.
  5. 5Injection screenPrompt and retrieved context screened for untrusted-content patterns.
  6. 6DLP & maskingRestricted payloads masked or tokenised inline.
  7. 7Policy decisionCompiled policy bundle evaluated; allow, warn or block.
  8. 8Human in the loopRestricted actions parked for a named approver before execution.
  9. 9Ledger barrierDecision hash-chained into the audit ledger before the response is released.

Registry record

Source of truth for this agent

Registry ID
AGT-1161
Business owner
V. Kulkarni
Department
Payments
Model endpoint
Azure OpenAI · gpt-4.1
Version
v4.3
Data classification
Restricted
Human-in-the-loop
Enforced on restricted actions

Trust composition

Grounding & citations92
Fairness82
Security posture90
Oversight coverage96

Wired integrations

Signed manifest — nothing else is reachable

Azure OpenAI · gpt-4.1connected

LLM / model endpoint · Microsoft Azure · scopes chat.completions, embeddings

Retail Loan Originationconnected

Business application · In-house (LOS) · scopes application.read, decision.write

Policy & Product Knowledge Baseconnected

Data source · In-house vector store · scopes retrieve

core.accounts.closeconnected

Tool / function · Core banking (Finacle) · scopes close

Policies in force

POL-002 · No account closure without approvalPOL-003 · No loan rejection without explanationPOL-004 · No customer data sent to public LLMPOL-005 · High-value transaction requires human approvalPOL-006 · PII masking requiredPOL-008 · Prompt injection protectionPOL-011 · Narrative grounding required

Recent decisions

Live gateway stream filtered to this agent

11:36:36emp-20074escalate

Reconcile this SWIFT MT103 exception and rebook it.

POL-005 · High-value transaction approval · risk 69 · 980 ms

11:34:35emp-20337escalate

Reconcile this SWIFT MT103 exception and rebook it.

POL-005 · High-value transaction approval · risk 77 · 1200 ms

11:34:36emp-20255escalate

Reconcile this SWIFT MT103 exception and rebook it.

POL-005 · High-value transaction approval · risk 74 · 1334 ms

11:33:56emp-20888escalate

Reconcile this SWIFT MT103 exception and rebook it.

POL-005 · High-value transaction approval · risk 76 · 399 ms

11:29:50emp-20870escalate

Reconcile this SWIFT MT103 exception and rebook it.

POL-005 · High-value transaction approval · risk 61 · 930 ms

11:30:40emp-20545escalate

Reconcile this SWIFT MT103 exception and rebook it.

POL-005 · High-value transaction approval · risk 71 · 1213 ms

Open risks

Drill into the investigation

Money-movement tools exposed outside signed manifestcritical

RSK-4408 · Unauthorized access · SLA 2 days

Ledger entries

Hash-chained decision records

Blocked at gateway

AUD-918441 · 2026-07-26 11:41:55.902

Governance obligations

  • Quarterly attestation by V. Kulkarni under MB-04
  • Restricted actions parked for a named human approver
  • Kill switch tested; revocation propagates in under 30 seconds
  • Evidence retained ten years for regulator inspection